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Market Valuation of Accrued Social 
Security Beneﬁ  ts
John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
8.1    Introduction
One measure of the health of the Social Security system is the diﬀerence 
between the present value of Social Security beneﬁ  ts accrued to date and 
the market value of the Social Security trust fund. This measure, referred to 
as the maximum transition cost, is comparable to the one used to gauge the 
fundedness of private deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension plans and provides an estimate 
of the cost of switching from a primarily pay-  as-  you-  go Social Security 
system to a fully-  funded one.
How should present values be computed for this calculation in light of 
future uncertainties? We argue that it is important to use market value. Since 
claims on accrued beneﬁ  ts are not currently traded in ﬁ  nancial markets, 
however, we cannot directly observe a market value. In this chapter, we there-
fore use a model to estimate what the market price for these claims would 
be if they were traded.
In valuing such claims, the key issue is properly adjusting for risk. We 
John Geanakoplos is the James Tobin Professor of Economics at Yale University and an 
external professor of the Santa Fe Institute. Stephen P. Zeldes is the Benjamin Rosen Professor 
of Economics and Finance at Columbia University and a research associate of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
We thank Ryan Chahrour, Ben Marx, Theodore Papageorgiou, and Sami Ragab for research 
assistance, and Mark Broadie, Deborah Lucas, Kent Smetters, and seminar participants at the 
Conference on Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk (Kellogg School of Man-
agement, February 2007) and at Columbia University for helpful comments and suggestions. 
This research was supported by the US Social Security Administration (SSA) through grant 
#10-  P-  98363-  1-  04 to the National Bureau of Economic Research as part of the SSA Retire-
ment Research Consortium. The ﬁ  ndings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the 
authors and do not represent the views of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government, or 
the NBER.214        John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
contend that the traditional actuarial approach—the approach currently 
used by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in generating its most 
widely cited numbers—does not adjust appropriately for aggregate risk in 
future ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows. In particular, the SSA methodology computes the 
expected value of aggregate cash ﬂ  ows for each future date and then dis-
counts these at a riskless rate of interest. Instead, we treat aggregate Social 
Security payments as dividends on a risky asset, and ask what that asset 
would be worth if it were traded in ﬁ  nancial markets. We call the resulting 
estimate the market value of Social Security obligations. Eﬀectively, market 
valuation incorporates a risk premium that reﬂ  ects the market risk of the 
cash ﬂ  ows being discounted. If beneﬁ  ts are risky and this risk is priced by 
the market, then market value will diﬀer from actuarial estimates.
Why do we believe that market value is the relevant measure of ﬁ  nancial 
status? Let us begin with a simple example. Suppose that a worker’s Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts were always equal to the dividends of one share of a par-
ticular stock. It would be sensible to quote the value of those beneﬁ  ts at 
the market price of the stock. That would, for example, allow the worker 
to compare the size of his private portfolio, which might hold shares of 
the same stock, and his Social Security portfolio of beneﬁ  ts. Similarly for 
the Social Security system as a whole, if all the promised beneﬁ  ts together 
were identical to 20 percent of the combined European stock market, then 
one- ﬁ  fth of European stocks’ market capitalization would be a useful guide 
to understanding the cost of transitioning to a fully funded Social Security 
system. The market value can also be seen as the amount that the govern-
ment would need to pay participants in the ﬁ  nancial market to accept its 
obligations or liabilities.
Under the current methodology, however, the SSA would likely report 
much larger numbers for this worker’s promised beneﬁ  ts, because the SSA 
numbers would ignore the riskiness of the dividends. Historically, total stock 
returns have been much higher than the riskless rate. This suggests that 
stock dividends are indeed subject to the kind of uncertainty that leads cash 
ﬂ  ows to be more heavily discounted by the market. Of course theory, begin-
ning with the capital asset pricing model, also suggests that stock dividends 
should be discounted by more than the riskless rate.
This example, linking stock market risk to risk in Social Security beneﬁ  ts, 
is not as far-  fetched as it might appear. Beneﬁ  ts are by no means risk free. 
The US Social Security system is “wage-  indexed”; that is, future beneﬁ  ts 
are tied directly to the economywide average wage index around the year of 
the worker’s statutory retirement age. (We discuss the precise formula later.) 
We argue that wages and stock prices are linked in the long run, eﬀectively 
linking Social Security beneﬁ  ts to the performance of the stock market.
Theoretically, a long- run relationship between wages and stocks is natural. 
If we believe that ﬁ  fty years from now American businesses will be failing 
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well. Over the long term, countries with high business proﬁ  ts per capita have 
also paid high wages. Empirically, Benzoni, Collin- Dufresne, and Goldstein 
(2007) ﬁ  nd evidence of cointegration between stocks and wages over a long 
sample of US data (1927 to 2004), despite the well-  known diﬃculties of 
identifying such relationships in ﬁ  nite samples. We believe there is already 
strong evidence for the wage-  stock link; our chapter suggests one more rea-
son why studying this relationship further is important.
Real wages and stock market returns do not seem to be contemporane-
ously correlated, as Goetzmann (2008) and others have pointed out. But it 
is crucial to realize that a lack of short-  run correlation does not imply the 
absence of a long-  run correlation. Consider a simple thought experiment. 
Suppose that wages (W) and dividends (D) always moved one for one in a 
geometric random walk, and that at every period investors could forecast 
dividends one period in advance with certainty, but had no information 
about the more distant future. Assuming a constant risk-  free interest rate 
and pricing kernel, the price of the stock would then be Pt  Dt1 for some 
constant . Stock market returns (Pt1  Dt1)/  Pt  Dt2/  Dt1  1/   would 
be independent of contemporaneous wage growth Wt1/  Wt  Dt1/  Dt, but 
in the long run stock levels and wage levels would be nearly perfectly cor-
related.
To take another example, suppose, following Benzoni, Collin-  Dufresne, 
and Goldstein (2007), that dividends follow a geometric random walk and 
that wages also follow a geometric random walk with an independent ﬂ  uc-
tuation, but with a drift that depends on the ratio of current dividends to 
current wages. Once again we would ﬁ  nd almost no short-  run correlation 
between wage growth and stock returns, but it is easy to see that a sustained 
period of high stock dividends and high stock returns would likely fore-
shadow a period of high wage growth.
In what follows, we assume that wages and dividends follow this process, 
so that there is a positive long-  run correlation between average labor earn-
ings and the stock market. We then use derivative pricing methods stan-
dard in the ﬁ  nance literature to compute the market price of individual 
claims on future beneﬁ  ts, which depend on age and macro state variables. 
Finally, we aggregate the market value of beneﬁ  ts across all cohorts to 
arrive at an overall value of accrued beneﬁ  ts and of the maximum transition 
cost.1
We ﬁ nd that the market value of accrued Social Security beneﬁ  ts is sub-
stantially less than the “actuarial” value, and that the diﬀerence is especially 
large for younger cohorts. Overall, the market value of accrued beneﬁ  ts is 
only four-  ﬁ  fths of that implied by the actuarial approach. Ignoring retirees 
1. In this chapter, we focus on the maximum transition cost measure of ﬁ  nancial status. In 
ongoing work (Geanakoplos and Zeldes, 2009b) we examine alternative open and closed group 
measures that incorporate future taxes and future accruals.216        John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
(for whom the valuations are the same), market value is only 70 percent as 
large as that implied by the actuarial approach. This implies that the market 
value of Social Security’s unfunded obligations, as measured by the maxi-
mum transition cost measure, is signiﬁ  cantly less than the actuarial value 
commonly presented by the SSA.
This diﬀerence by itself might change the public’s view of the transition 
cost of the system, and is therefore reason enough to pursue a measure 
of market value. Recent suggestions by the Federal Accounting Standards 
Advisory Board to include Social Security obligations on the US balance 
sheet make the question of their value especially pertinent.
One logical consequence of our approach is that large decreases in the 
stock market, such as we saw in 2007 and 2008, should signiﬁ  cantly decrease 
the market value of accrued Social Security beneﬁ  ts. The SSA, by contrast, 
does not seem to have moved its calculations by much.
In work done after the original version of this chapter was written, 
Blocker, Kotlikoﬀ, and Ross (2008) also attempt a market valuation of out-
standing Social Security obligations. They argue for risk adjustments due 
to (a) the correlation between wage growth and returns on traded assets 
and (b) the inﬂ  ation insurance provided by consumer price index (CPI)-
 indexed  beneﬁ  ts. They empirically estimate the correlations between wage 
growth and traded assets, and they conclude that the market value of Social 
Security obligations is greater than the actuarial value. In contrast, we 
reach the opposite conclusion, namely that the market value is less than the 
actuarial value.
One reason for this disparity is that in addition to adjusting for risk, 
Blocker, Kotlikoﬀ, and Ross also change the risk-free rate of interest to 
what they argue is a more reasonable value. Based on the term structure for 
Treasury Inﬂ  ation Protected Securities (TIPS), Blocker, Kotlikoﬀ, and Ross 
assume a risk-  free rate between 1.5 percent and 2 percent, while the SSA 
projections assume a rate of 2.9 percent for nearly the entire horizon of its 
projections. To the extent that the SSA uses too high a risk-  free rate, SSA 
will underestimate the present value of accrued beneﬁ  ts, but this would be 
felt even if Social Security beneﬁ  ts were not at all risky (and thus required no 
risk adjustment). Blocker, Kotlikoff, and Ross do not disentangle the effects 
of the adjustment for risk and the change in the risk-free rate, but it appears 
to us that their choice of a lower risk-  free rate is the primary factor driving 
their results.
It is diﬃcult to ascertain from the Blocker, Kotlikoﬀ, and Ross paper the 
size or even the direction of the two true risk adjustments that they make. 
Regarding risk adjustment for wages (see point [a] previously), Blocker and 
colleagues focus on short-  run correlations of wages and stocks; they esti-
mate the correlation using at most a one-  period lag and ﬁ  nd it to be small. 
We argue that even though the short-  run correlation is close to zero, the 
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should be large and should decrease the market value today of a claim on 
future economywide wages.
Regarding the risk adjustment to the value of the inﬂ  ation-  indexed annu-
ity as of the retirement date (see point [b] previously), we agree that some 
adjustment for inﬂ  ation insurance may be appropriate (as reﬂ  ected in the 
diﬀerence between the real return on nominal bonds and the real return on 
indexed bonds). However, this inﬂ  ation risk premium is likely much smaller 
than the 90 to 140 basis point spread used by Blocker, Kotlikoﬀ, and Ross. 
We assume this premium is zero in our analysis.2
Our chapter is structured as follows. In section 8.2, we describe why we 
think that market value is the most appropriate measure for estimating 
Social Security obligations. Section 8.3 describes how our previous work can 
be used to frame accrued beneﬁ  ts in terms of units of a potentially tradable 
ﬁ  nancial security (a Personal Annuitized Average Wage [PAAW]). Section 
8.4 shows how to price this security, incorporating the market price of risk. 
In section 8.5, we estimate the quantity of PAAWs outstanding by cohort, 
and in section 8.6 we combine the information in 8.4 and 8.5 to arrive at an 
estimate of the market value of accrued Social Security beneﬁ  ts. In section 
8.7, we consider the robustness of our results to changes in the parameter 
that determines the strength of the wage-  stock link. Section 8.8 concludes.
8.2      The Importance of Market Valuation
Market valuation answers the question: “what payment would ﬁ  nancial 
markets require for taking on the responsibility of paying Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts?” A market price for Social Security obligations would also provide 
important information to households, governments, private pension plans, 
other market participants, and administrators of Social Security. In fact, 
the 2007 Social Security Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods 
(Technical Panel 2007) cited an earlier version of our chapter and recom-
mended that the Trustees of Social Security consider adopting risk- adjusted 
discount rates.
Finding the market value of Social Security liabilities also implies the 
ability to hedge them, since valuation and hedging are dual computations. 
If the Social Security trust fund were someday permitted to diversify out of 
government bonds, this would provide a valuable guide to determining the 
optimal portfolio allocation.
It is worth noting that the measure we compute ignores the general equi-
librium eﬀects of selling the full quantity of the asset; bringing all Social 
Security obligations to market at once could well change how the market 
2. Note that the measure of ﬁ  nancial status that Blocker, Kotlikoﬀ, and Ross (2008) examine 
(a closed group measure that includes future taxes and future accrued beneﬁ  ts of current work-
ers) diﬀers somewhat from ours, but this cannot explain the diﬀerence in results.218        John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
values these and other assets. In this respect, our measure is no diﬀerent 
than “market capitalization” in the stock market, or measures of aggregate 
holdings in real estate.
A market price for Social Security obligations will be especially impor-
tant for improving government accounting. In its annual Financial Report, 
the US government produces a balance sheet that summarizes the assets 
and liabilities of the Federal Government. One controversial aspect of the 
balance sheet is how to account for social insurance programs. In 2006, 
the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB) published a 
preliminary statement on new standards for social insurance accounting 
(FASAB 2006). The document described two views. The Primary View, 
held by the majority of the board, would recognize every accrued beneﬁ  t 
as a liability of the system.3 Under this view, liabilities should be based on 
expected beneﬁ  ts “attributable” to earnings to date, using current beneﬁ  t 
formulas. In contrast, the Alternative View advocates continuing the current 
practice of acknowledging only those beneﬁ  ts that are “due and payable” at 
the time of valuation. Essentially, under the alternative view only current-
 period beneﬁ  ts not yet paid to beneﬁ  ciaries (an amount close to zero) would 
be counted as a liability.
Supporters of the Primary View argue that recognizing the new liability 
is most consistent with the principle of accounting based on accrual, as 
opposed to cash ﬂ  ows, and best captures the economic costs incurred by 
social insurance programs each year. Supporters of the Alternative View 
argue that given political and economic uncertainty regarding Social Secu-
rity, such obligations are neither legally guaranteed nor reliably estimable. 
They also worry that, because of the large size of the obligation, incorpo-
rating it as a liability may make other important spending choices appear 
inconsequential.
In a November 2008 update of the statement (FASAB 2008), FASAB 
proposed a compromise between these views: accrued beneﬁ  t “obligations” 
are to be provided in a note on the federal ﬁ  nancial statements, and another 
measure referred to as the closed group measure (equal to the accrued obli-
gations to date plus future taxes and future accruals of current participants) 
is to be reported as a separate line just below the balance sheet. If the com-
promise prevails, measures of Social Security’s future obligations will gain 
prominence in government ﬁ  nancial statements, but no new liabilities will 
be recognized on the balance sheet at this time.
Whether or not one wishes to characterize future beneﬁ  t obligations as 
“liabilities,” correctly computing their value is essential. It is widely agreed 
that some measure of the present value of future cash ﬂ  ows should be 
3. Accrued beneﬁ  ts would be those earned by fully- insured participants (e.g., Social Security 
participants who have achieved forty-  quarters of covered earnings, the minimum to receive 
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reported, even if not on the balance sheet. Proper valuation of these risky 
ﬂ  ows will be essential to the new guidelines’ eﬃcacy in accurately portraying 
the ﬁ  nancial status of the Social Security program.
For individuals, a market price for cohort beneﬁ  ts would provide infor-
mation about the market value of their own beneﬁ  ts, helping them with 
ﬁ  nancial planning decisions regarding saving and asset allocation. A true 
market price would allow individual households to consider Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts as any other asset in their portfolio. The cohort-  speciﬁ  c estimates 
in this chapter give some idea of the value of new beneﬁ  t accruals and how 
they compare with tax contributions. Workers could compute, for example, 
a market-  based “money’s worth” measure such as the ratio of the present 
value (PV) of beneﬁ  ts to the PV of contributions (for a further description 
of money’s worth measures, see Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes [1999]). 
A market value for beneﬁ  ts would also likely make it more diﬃcult for the 
government to take them away, enhancing property rights.
Finally, if markets for bonds indexed to Social Security obligations actu-
ally develop in the future, buyers and sellers of these new securities would 
be forced to make the same kind of computations we propose here. If the 
private sector were permitted to issue these securities, the government could 
purchase them from the private sector in order to cover a portion of the 
beneﬁ  t obligations accrued each year.
8.3    Translating  Accrued  Beneﬁ  ts into Units of 
Marketable New Securities (PAAWs)
Under current Social Security rules, workers and employers together con-
tribute 12.4 percent of “covered earnings” (i.e., all labor income up to the 
earnings cap, equal to $102,000 in 2008). Upon retirement, workers receive 
beneﬁ  ts that are linked to their earnings history, and in a particular way, 
to average earnings in the economy. For each year in the worker’s history, 
earnings are divided by the average economywide wage index from that 
year, and then multiplied by the average economywide wage index in the 
computation year (typically age sixty).4 Since a worker’s beneﬁ  ts depend 
crucially on average wages in the computation year, they are subject to a 
type of aggregate risk. In this chapter, we price this risk.
The maximum transition cost is reported annually in a recurring note from 
the Oﬃce of the Actuary (Wade, Schultz, and Goss 2008), and is intended to 
represent the present value of beneﬁ  ts accrued by current and past workers, 
net of current trust fund assets. Estimating this measure requires establish-
ing what it means for beneﬁ  ts to be accrued. By deﬁ  nition, accrued beneﬁ  ts 
4. In Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2008), we assumed all wages were indexed to age sixty-  ﬁ  ve 
wages. Under SSA rules, however, wages after age sixty-  two are included at their nominal 
levels in the formula while wages from earlier years are indexed to economy average wages in 
the individual’s sixtieth year. Thus, aggregate wage risk in a cohort is resolved after year sixty.220        John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
can rise, but never fall. In Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009a), we show that 
there are many feasible accrual rules and describe two natural rules in detail. 
For simplicity, we focus here on one of these, “the straight- line” accrual rule, 
in which accrued beneﬁ  ts to date are deﬁ  ned by setting future wages equal 
to the worker’s average wage to date and prorating the resulting beneﬁ  ts 
by a scale factor related to years of work.5 This is a relatively conservative 
accrual rule (in the sense of delaying accrual) and thus tends to decrease the 
accruals of younger cohorts. Since these are the cohorts for whom the risk 
adjustment is important, this accrual rule tends to decrease the magnitude 
of the overall risk adjustment. We show that, even with this accrual rule, the 
risk adjustment is quite signiﬁ  cant.
In Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009a), we described how to create a system 
of personal accounts that achieves many of the core goals of supporters 
of the current system, including risk-  sharing and redistribution. We called 
these “Progressive Personal Accounts.” One step in that process was to show 
that a personal account system could be structured to exactly reproduce the 
beneﬁ  ts promised under the current system. This involved the creation of a 
new ﬁ  nancial security, which we named a Personal Annuitized Average Wage 
security, or PAAW for short. Whether or not Progressive Personal Accounts 
are adopted, this equivalence means that establishing a price for this theo-
retical security is suﬃcient for pricing existing Social Security obligations.
We deﬁ  ne a PAAW as a security that pays its owner one inﬂ  ation-  corrected 
dollar for every year of his life after the year (tR) in which he hits the statu-
tory retirement age (R), multiplied by the economywide average wage (Wtc) 
in the computation year (tc) that he hits age sixty. The PAAWs are tied to 
speciﬁ  c individuals, indexed by i, through their mortality, the wage index in 
their cohort’s computation year, Wtc, and the year of the ﬁ  rst payout on their 
security (tR). In this chapter, we assume all workers retire at sixty- ﬁ  ve, ﬁ  xing 
the relationship between tc and tR. In this context, the notation PAAW(i, tR) 
identiﬁ  es the relevant information for any PAAW.
Each additional dollar that an individual earns generates additional 
5. Speciﬁ  cally, we compute average relative earnings over all years the worker has earnings, 
up to thirty-  ﬁ  ve years. If the worker has earnings from more than thirty-  ﬁ  ve years, we take 
the average over the thirty-  ﬁ  ve highest earning years. Average relative earnings are then en-
tered into the current Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) formula, and the result is prorated by 
min{1,(work years/ 35)}. For example, if a worker has worked for twenty- ﬁ  ve years (equal to 5/ 7 
of thirty- ﬁ  ve years), we average the relative earnings from just these twenty- ﬁ  ve years (eﬀectively 
setting future wages equal to this average), compute the resulting number of PAAWs using the 
PIA formula, and then multiply the result by 5/  7. Note that this is not identical to the SSA 
procedure for calculating accruals for their Maximum Transition Cost measure (they average 
the best 4/ 5 of earnings years and scale PIA by (age- 22)/ 40), but the two procedures give similar 
results. An alternative accrual method, also described in Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009a), is 
one we call the “fastest” accrual method, which sets future wages to zero and does not prorate, 
giving more rapid accruals by adjusting for age before the (progressive) calculation of PIA 
rather than after. (This is termed “fastest” because no other possibilities exist that have faster 
accumulation and also satisfy the constraint that accrued beneﬁ  ts will not fall even if future 
earnings are all zero.) See Jackson (2004) for a further discussion of accrual accounting.Market Valuation of Accrued Social Security Beneﬁ  ts    2 2 1
accrued beneﬁ  ts or PAAWs. At any point in time t, an individual’s accrued 
beneﬁ  ts can be summarized completely by the number of PAAWs owned. 
The present value of accrued beneﬁ  ts is therefore equal to the quantity 
of accrued PAAWs (known at time t) multiplied by the present value of a 
PAAW(i, tR).
The PAAW valuations should diﬀer for individuals in the same age cohort 
with diﬀerent mortality probabilities. For example, the longer life expectan-
cies of women means their PAAWs would be more valuable, if they were 
traded separately. We assume that all members of a birth cohort have the 
same age proﬁ  le of survival probabilities.6 In the following sections, we 
examine how to price PAAWs for each cohort, and we then estimate the 
quantity of PAAWs outstanding and the market value of these PAAWS for 
each cohort.
8.4      The Price of a PAAW
In Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2009a), we argued that if the Social Security 
system either required workers to sell a small fraction of their PAAWs or 
issued extra PAAWS, these securities could be pooled together and sold to 
ﬁ  nancial markets. In this section, we estimate what the market price of these 
pooled PAAWs would be if they were traded in ﬁ  nancial markets. To do so, 
we develop a valuation model that links the risk in PAAWs to the risk in 
an asset that is already priced, namely stocks. We compare this value with 
the value generated from the same model, but ignoring the adjustment for 
risk. We refer to these respectively as the “market” (or “risk-  adjusted”) and 
“actuarial” (or “unadjusted”) values.7
8.4.1    Methodology
The PAAW payouts are tied to average economywide wages in a spe-
ciﬁ  c year in the future. They are therefore tied to the macroeconomy and 
potentially to the stock market. Lucas and Zeldes (2006) show how to value 
deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t (DB) pension liabilities when payouts are tied to future 
wages of the individual. We apply that approach here, modifying it to take 
into account the speciﬁ  cs of Social Security beneﬁ  t rules. One important 
diﬀerence between the two applications is that under private DB pensions, 
the accrued beneﬁ  t obligation (ABO) depends only on past labor earnings 
(and thus requires no risk adjustment), while the projected beneﬁ  t obliga-
tion (PBO) depends on future labor earnings. Due to the wage indexing 
of Social Security, even the ABO measure of Social Security depends on 
6. To the extent that there is a correlation between life expectancy and number of accrued 
PAAWs, we will underestimate the value of each cohort’s accrued PAAWs.
7. A comparison of the risk-  adjusted and actuarial values could be used to back out an 
estimate of the appropriate risk-  adjusted discount rate. We pursue this in Geanakoplos and 
Zeldes (2009b).222        John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
future (economywide) labor earnings, and therefore even the ABO measure 
of Social Security requires an adjustment for salary risk.
The cash ﬂ  ow stream on a PAAW(i, tR) depends on the economywide 
average earnings index Wtc at time tc, the life span of individual i, and the 
year of retirement tR. In particular, an individual’s retirement beneﬁ  ts 
are an annuity proportional to the average wage in his sixtieth year. If we 
deﬁ  ne a wage bond as a security that pays an amount equal to the average 
wage in some future year, then we can decompose the problem of pricing a 
PAAW into the problem of pricing the wage bond (which requires a model 
of wage growth), and pricing the annuity (which we assume is indepen-
dent of wage growth). We proceed in this manner, ﬁ  rst pricing the wage 
bond, then combining our result with a standard valuation for the cohort-
 speciﬁ  c annuity.
The key issue for pricing the wage bond is the correlation, at diﬀerent 
horizons, between aggregate wages and dividends, and thus the value of 
the stock market. To model this relationship, we use a simpliﬁ  ed, discrete-
 time version of the model used in Benzoni, Collin- Dufresne, and Goldstein 
(2007). We model the relationship between real variables and assume that 
inﬂ  ation does not aﬀect the relationship between real wages and real divi-
dends. We begin with a stationary geometric random walk process for log 
real dividends (d):
(1)  dth  dt  hgd  
2
d 
2  d h zd,th.
The dividend growth shock, zd,th, is assumed to be standard normal.8
Benzoni and colleagues assume a stationary pricing kernel with a constant 
price of risk, . This implies a constant price-  dividend ratio, and therefore 
a constant dividend yield, 	.9 Because the stock price is proportional to 
current period dividends, it too will follow a geometric random walk with 
the growth in the stock price exactly equal to the growth in dividends. The 
total real stock return (rs) thus equals the dividend yield plus the growth in 
real dividends:
(2)  rs
th  h	  (dth  dt)  hgd  	  
2
d 
2  d h zd,th.
8. Equation (1) therefore implies a representation of dividend levels with log- normal shocks 
and expected growth in the level of dividends equal to gd.









 (1  r  d)–  t (1  gd)t.










r  d –   gd
.
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Note that equation (2) implies the counterfactual result that stock returns 
and dividend growth have the same volatility.
Next, we describe the process for log real wages (wt), in which log wage 
growth is a function of (a) a deterministic wage growth, or “drift”, param-
eter; (b) the current-  period deviation from the long-  term average wage-
  dividend ratio; and (c) an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) 
wage growth shock:
(3)  wth  wt  hgw  
2
w 
2  h(wt  dt   w d )  w h zw,th.
In this model, wage growth tends to correct deviations in the wage-
  dividend ratio from its long term level,  w d . The parameter  determines the 
rate at which the wage-  dividend ratio “error corrects.”
As a baseline calibration, we choose parameters that are consistent with 
the 2008 Trustees Report intermediate cost assumptions. As discussed 
before, Blocker, Kotlikoﬀ, and Ross argue that this is not the most reasonable 
parameterization. In order to emphasize the role of risk- correction, however, 
we believe this is the best starting point. Accordingly, the real risk-  free rate, 
r, is set to 2.9 percent and average real wage growth, gw, to 1.1 percent. In 
addition, we choose the dividend yield, 	, in order to match the empiri-
cal equity premium, which we estimate to be 5.1 percent annually over the 
period from 1959 through the ﬁ  rst half of 2008 and we set gd to 1.1 percent 
(equal to gw).10 Note that this implies a counterfactually large dividend yield, 
	, of 6.9 percent  5.1 percent –  1.1 percent  2.9 percent. Finally, we set d 
(the standard deviation of stock returns and dividend growth), equal to 12 
percent, based on the volatility of real stock returns in our sample.11
From the perspective of this chapter, the most important parameter cali-
bration is our choice of . Benzoni, Collin-  Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) 
estimate  to be between .05 and .2, and take 0.15 as their baseline value, 
which we follow in this chapter. We also examine the robustness of our 
results to diﬀerent values of .
Following Lucas and Zeldes (2006), we assume that all risk not captured 
by the relationship between wages and stocks would be priced by the market 
at zero, and we use risk-  neutral Monte Carlo derivative pricing techniques 
(as in Cox, Ross, and Rubenstein 1979) to price a wage bond as a derivative 
10. Our estimate of the equity premium is equal to the (arithmetic) average of the monthly 
return on the S&P 500 index minus the average interest rate on three-  month T-  bills.
11. Benzoni, Collin- Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) assume an equity premium of 6 percent 
and use the parameter conﬁ  guration gd  1.8 percent, r  1 percent, and d  16 percent. We 
have selected gd and r to best match the assumptions underlying the SSA actuarial estimates, 
even though these choices may be controversial. Because of Jensen’s terms in the wage process, 
however, E(W(t  n)/  W(t))^(1/  n) is increasing over time. Thus, although we match the actuarial 
projection of wage growth year-  over-  year, cumulative wage growth increases to an annualized 
rate of 1.6 percent at the forty-  year horizon. In levels, expected wages are about 20 percent 
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on the stock market. This entails generating a set of hypothetical “risk-
  neutral” probabilities on the set of possible returns for stocks such that, 
under those probabilities, the expected return would equal the risk- free rate. 
In our simple model, this “risk-  neutral” distribution for stock returns is 
normal with a mean equal to the risk-  free rate and the standard deviation 
equal to its original empirical value.
We use Monte Carlo techniques to simulate stock returns and wages using 
the risk-  neutral probabilities. We generate 200,000 replications of the wage 
and dividend process, each forty- ﬁ  ve years in length, and take averages over 
the realizations. Our estimate of the “risk-  adjusted” price of a year-  t wage 
bond is equal to the average value of the simulated wage at year t, using 
risk-  neutral probabilities, discounted at the risk-  free rate.
We use the wage bond price to compute the current market value of a 
PAAW. A PAAW for this worker promises payments proportional to the age 
sixty average wage, starting in the retirement year, which we assume to be age 
sixty- ﬁ  ve. To compute annuity prices, we use the cohort life tables from Bell 
and Miller (2002) and assume that all individuals of the same age face the 
same conditional survival probabilities12 (i.e., that there is no heterogeneity 
or private information about these probabilities). We also assume that the 
market price of aggregate longevity risk and inﬂ  ation risk are each zero.
As a concrete example of how we compute PAAW prices, consider the 
cohort of age ﬁ  fty, which reaches age sixty in 2015, ten years from our valu-
ation date. We compute the market (risk- adjusted) value in 2005 of the 2015 
wage bond to be 0.658 current wage units. The age sixty value of a one dollar 
perpetual real annuity starting at age sixty- ﬁ  ve, valued using cohort- speciﬁ  c 
mortality and a risk-  free rate, is $10.88. Finally, conditional on being ﬁ  fty 
years old in 2005, there is a 92.3 percent chance of reaching age sixty, the year 
we value the annuity. Therefore, the 2005 market value of a PAAW for this 
cohort is (10.88)  (0.658)  (0.923)  6.60 current wage units. Multiplying 
by the current value of the average wage gives the market value of a PAAW, 
measured in dollars.
8.4.2    Actuarial  Value
The standard actuarial approach for computing present value makes no 
adjustment for risk; that is, it computes the expected value of the cash ﬂ  ows 
and discounts at the risk-  free rate.13 To estimate the “non-  risk-  adjusted” or 
actuarial price of a wage bond, we use the same model described before, but 
generate a set of wage and dividend realizations that are based on the true 
12. For the calculations presented, we used the survival probabilities for males born in 1980. 
Using sex-  speciﬁ  c survival probabilities increases our measure of accrued beneﬁ  ts by about 7 
percent (since women typically live longer than men). The risk-  adjustment, however, is only 
negligibly aﬀected.
13. Note that if all individuals in the economy were risk- neutral, no adjustment for risk would 
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probabilities, and then discount the average value of the simulated wage 
at the risk-  free rate. We use the resulting wage bond price to compute the 
actuarial price of a PAAW. In the example above, the actuarial value in 2005 
of a 2015 wage bond is 0.830 wage units (versus a market value of 0.658). 
The resulting actuarial value in 2005 of a 2015 PAAW is (10.88) × (0.830) × 
(0.923) = 8.34 current wage units (versus a market value of 6.60).
8.4.3    Results
Figure 8.1 compares the actuarial and market prices of the wage bonds. 
The risk adjustment causes the market price to be everywhere lower than 
the actuarial price. In addition, the diﬀerence grows over time, since wages 
further out are more risky and subject to a larger adjustment.14
Figure 8.2 compares the actuarial and market prices of PAAWs. Figure 
8.3 shows the ratio of market (risk-  corrected) to actuarial PAAW prices for 
each cohort. For cohorts that have already surpassed the computation age 
(sixty), the risk-  adjustment has no impact on the valuation. This occurs 
because aggregate wages are the only source of priced risk in our model, 
and cohort beneﬁ  ts depend on aggregate wages in the year it turns sixty. For 
younger cohorts, however, there is a signiﬁ  cant diﬀerence between the two 
methods. For cohorts under age forty, the market measure is less than half 
of the actuarial valuation. For the youngest cohorts we consider (age twenty 
in 2005), risk-adjusted accruals are worth less than 20 percent of their value 
under the standard approach.
8.5      The Quantity of PAAWs Outstanding
In this section, we estimate the stream of future beneﬁ  ts that have been 
accrued by each cohort based on contributions to date. As pointed out pre-
viously, these can be neatly described with a single summary statistic: the 
number of PAAWs accrued by the cohort.
To construct accrual, we use data from the Continuous Work History 
Sample (CWHS), a 1 percent sample of workers and beneﬁ  ciaries.15 The 
key feature of this data set, for our purposes, is that it includes individual- 
speciﬁ  c earnings histories.16 We compute accrued beneﬁ  ts for both current 
14. Both prices decrease with the horizon, reﬂ  ecting the fact that the risk-  free rate is greater 
than average wage growth. In addition, both prices are slightly less than one in the initial 2005 
period due to our assumption that cash ﬂ  ows occur at the end of each period and are discounted 
back to the beginning of the period.
15. We are grateful to Jae Song and Wojciech Kopczuk for providing us with summary 
statistics from the CWHS.
16. Earnings occurring before 1951 are treated diﬀerently in this data set and are typically 
available only as single entry summing all earning from 1950 and earlier. We ignore these earn-
ings entirely, meaning we slightly underestimate beneﬁ  ts for the oldest cohorts we consider. 
Because the beneﬁ  t formula allows workers to exclude low earnings years, typically early years 
in a worker’s history, our underestimate should be very small.226        John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
and former workers (including retirees). For retirees this simply entails 
averaging the thirty-  ﬁ  ve years of highest relative earnings and entering this 
average into the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) formula (redeﬁ  ned to be 
in units of future economywide wages). For workers who have not already 
retired, we use the straight- line accrual formula described before to compute 
PAAW accruals based on worker earnings histories to date. Because our data 
Fig. 8.1    Wage bond prices
Fig.  8.2  Price-  per-  PAAWMarket Valuation of Accrued Social Security Beneﬁ  ts    2 2 7
set has no information on spousal earnings or status, our results ignore any 
potential spousal or survivor beneﬁ  ts. The quantity of PAAWs accrued to 
date by a cohort is equal to the sum of the PAAWs accrued to date by all 
individuals in the cohort.
8.5.1      Estimates of PAAW Quantities by Cohort
Figure 8.4 shows our estimate of PAAWs earned through 2004 for cohorts 
born between 1910 and 1986 (ages nineteen through ninety- ﬁ  ve in 2005). The 
hump shape in quantities reﬂ  ects three key features of beneﬁ  t accruals and 
Social Security demographics: (a) younger cohorts have shorter work his-
tories and thus have accrued fewer beneﬁ  ts; (b) the middle- aged cohorts are 
large and have already accrued most of their beneﬁ  ts; and (c) older cohorts 
have fewer members because of mortality (for example, in 2005 there were 
3.6 million living individuals aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve but only 2.3 million aged sixty-
 ﬁ ve and 1.7 million aged seventy-  ﬁ  ve).
8.6      The Market Value of Accrued Beneﬁ  ts
Once we have computed the price of a PAAW for each cohort and the 
quantity of PAAWs outstanding for each cohort, estimating the market 
value of accrued beneﬁ  ts simply involves multiplying the two and summing 
across cohorts. Figure 8.5 compares the risk-  adjusted and the actuarial 
valuations by cohort. As with the wage bond prices in ﬁ  gure 8.1, the risk-
 adjustment reduces the value of the liability for all of the nonretired cohorts. 
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Diﬀerences across cohorts of the adjustment suggest that risk-  correction 
should be a key consideration in evaluating the “fairness” of proposals to 
reform Social Security.
Table 8.1 sums accrued beneﬁ  ts across cohorts for an estimate of the total 
value of accrued beneﬁ  ts. We present two estimates: an actuarial valuation 
and a risk- adjusted valuation. Our estimate of total accrued beneﬁ  ts, based 
on the actuarial valuation methodology, is just under $13 trillion. Adjusting 
Fig. 8.4    Quantity of accrued PAAWs
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the Oﬃce of the Actuary’s own 2005 estimate of accrued beneﬁ  ts for compa-
rability gives a value of $12.2 trillion.17 Given our lack of information about 
beneﬁ  ts other than basic retirement beneﬁ  ts paid to primary beneﬁ  ciaries, 
our estimate of accruals without risk adjustment comes remarkably close 
to SSA ﬁ  gures.18
We estimate a market value for the same liability of $10.5 trillion, only 81 
percent of the actuarial value.19 This diﬀerence in valuation comes entirely 
from the risk-  correction; all other features of the pricing model are held 
17. Our estimate from CWHS data includes only “own-  history” accruals; that is, it excludes 
spousal and survivor beneﬁ  ts. To obtain a comparable estimate from SSA publications we start 
with the January 1, 2006 value of the Maximum Transition Cost of $15.8 trillion, which is the 
present value of accruals less the amount of the Social Security Trust Fund (Wade, Schultz, 
and Goss 2008). To this we add back the December 31, 2005 value of the OASDI Trust Fund 
of $1.86 trillion (Social Security Administration 2008). We then multiply this sum by the per-
centage of beneﬁ  ts paid to retired workers based on their own earnings history, which was 
roughly 70 percent in 2005 (Social Security Administration 2006). To make this adjustment, 
we assume that the proportion of beneﬁ  ts going to disability and survivors is constant across 
cohorts and over time. This implies that these programs represent a constant proportion of 
accrued beneﬁ  ts as well.
18. In principle our actuarial estimate should exactly match the adjusted SSA ﬁ  gure. 
Diﬀerences may arise for at least three reasons: (a) Our limited information does not allow us 
to perfectly adjust SSA ﬁ  gures derived from micro models. To make this adjustment, we make 
the simplifying assumption that the proportion of beneﬁ  ts going to spouses, survivors, and 
disabled beneﬁ  ciaries is constant across cohorts and over time. (b) The “straight-  line” accrual 
formula we use is slightly diﬀerent than the one used by SSA to compute the maximum transi-
tion cost (MTC) measure, principally because SSA excludes some years of low earnings in 
estimating PIA, even for workers who have yet to reach thirty-  ﬁ  ve years of earnings, while we 
do not (see footnote 5). (c) Expected long-  term growth in wages diﬀers from SSA projections, 
as described in footnote 11.
19. This diﬀers from an earlier (2007) draft of this chapter for three reasons. First, in this 
version we have linked retirement beneﬁ  ts to wages at age sixty (as opposed to age sixty-  ﬁ  ve in 
the earlier draft), eﬀectively removing ﬁ  ve years of risk from every cohort. This is appropriate 
because, as noted earlier, the age sixty wage index is used in computing beneﬁ  ts. Second, in 
this version, we use the straight-  line method of accrual, instead of the “fastest” method used 
in the earlier draft. We choose this because it more closely matches the measure used by the 
Oﬃce of the Actuary to compute the maximum transition cost estimates. It implies lower 
current accruals for nonretired workers—those for whom the risk adjustment matters. Under 
fastest accrual, the corresponding adjustment is 22 percent. Finally, in this draft we are using 
revised estimates from the 2005 CWHS, whereas in the previous version we used two sources: 
the 2004 CWHS and a set of OASDI beneﬁ  t expenditure projections provided by the SSA 
Oﬃce of the Actuary.
Table 8.1  Present value of accrued Social Security beneﬁ  ts under alternative 
valuation methods
    Total value (billions)  Under 60  Over 60
Actuarial (unadjusted) 12,977 8,572 4,405
Market (risk-  adjusted) 10,451 6,046 4,405
Market/actuarial   0.81   0.71   1.00
Note: 2006 Oﬃce of the Actuary (OACT) Actuarial Note estimate of Max. Trans. Cost  Jan 
1st 2006 Trust Fund balance, adjusted to include “own-  history” beneﬁ  ts only, equals 12.2 tril.230        John Geanakoplos and Stephen P. Zeldes
constant in generating the ﬁ  gures. This suggests that the standard approach 
of discounting expected future beneﬁ  ts by the risk-  free rate is signiﬁ  cantly 
overstating the size of accrued beneﬁ  ts. Appropriately correcting for risk 
to aggregate wage growth reduces our measure of Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
obligations by nearly 20 percent. Subtracting the end of 2005 value of the 
Old-  Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund (1.66 trillion) from 
both measures indicates that the market value estimate of the maximum 
transition cost measure of Social Security’s ﬁ  nancial status is only 78 percent 
as large as the actuarial value, suggesting a healthier system (in the sense 
of ease of transition to an alternative system) than found using traditional 
actuarial methods.
Table 8.1 also breaks down the liability for cohorts below age sixty, and 
those sixty and above. Age sixty is key because that is the year by which the 
wage risk to beneﬁ  ts is resolved. For the sixty and over group, the actuarial 
and risk-  adjusted estimates are identical, and the aggregate numbers reﬂ  ect 
this. When we examine the pre-  sixty-  year-  old group alone, however, we see 
signiﬁ  cantly larger diﬀerences between the actuarial and risk-  adjusted esti-
mates: correcting for risk reduces our measure of Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
obligations for those under sixty by nearly 30 percent.
8.7    Robustness
The parameter  plays a key role in our analysis because it governs the 
strength of the link between wages and the stock market. Our baseline cali-
bration follows Benzoni, Collin-  Dufresne, and Goldstein (2007) in setting 
this parameter to .15. However, because of the diﬃculty in estimating such 
cointegrating relationships, it is informative to examine the sensitivity of 
our results to this parameter. To do this, we perform the same simulation 
with a high (.25) and a low (.05) value for . Figure 8.6 shows the ratio of 
the risk-  adjusted price to the actuarial price for PAAWs under the alterna-
tive calibrations.
First, we ﬁ  nd, not surprisingly, that the importance of risk correction 
varies directly with : higher  implies that wage growth is more “exposed” 
to stock market risk and increases the size of the risk adjustment.
In addition, we see in ﬁ  gure 8.6 that the size of the risk correction varies 
in a nonlinear way with . For all cohorts, increasing  from a low value of 
.05 to our baseline value of .15 has a large eﬀect on the ratio of market to 
actuarial value, whereas further increasing  from the baseline to a value of 
.25 has a much smaller eﬀect.
Finally, the impact of varying  diﬀers across cohorts. Deﬁ  ne the risk 
adjustment as the distance as measured down from the dashed line. The 
percentage change in this risk adjustment in response to changing  is lower 
for the older cohorts than it is for the younger cohorts. Consider the ﬁ  fty-
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of the actuarial value under the “low ” parameterization, but 27 percent of 
the actuarial value under the “high ” parameter choice. In contrast, for the 
twenty- year- old cohort, the adjustment is large even for low , and raising  
results in a much smaller percentage increase in the adjustment than it did for 
the ﬁ  fty- year- old cohort. This pattern is natural; in our model, the long- run 
correlation between wages and the stock market is 1 for any  greater than 
0, even a small value. Thus, the risk adjustment for beneﬁ  ts far in the future 
will be (essentially) independent of the parameter . On the other hand, 
the shorter-  run correlation between wages and the stock market is highly 
dependent on , so that the risk adjustment of the beneﬁ  ts of workers closer 
to retirement is much more sensitive to the value of .
Table 8.2 aggregates the results across cohorts and examines how they 
change as  varies. Increasing  from the baseline of .15 to .25 increases the 
risk correction by only 4 percentage points (from 19 percent to 23 percent). 
On the other hand, lowering  from .15 to .05 decreases the risk adjust-
ment by 8 percentage points (from 19 percent to 11 percent), a much larger 
amount. The risk adjustment remains important, however, even with this 
weak link between wages and stock prices.
8.8      Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Future Research
We have argued that market value is the appropriate way to measure both 
the assets and the liabilities of the Social Security system. Market value 
calculations adjust for risk and diﬀer in important ways from the standard 
actuarial approach that discounts expected cash ﬂ  ows with a risk-  free rate. 
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We estimate that adjusting for risk reduces the present value of accrued 
beneﬁ  ts of the entire system by about 20 percent and of workers under age 
sixty by about 30 percent.
In ongoing work (Geanakoplos and Zeldes 2009b), we extend this 
approach to consider other measures of Social Security’s ﬁ  nancial status, 
including open group measures that incorporate both future Social Security 
contributions and the corresponding future accruals. Because future tax 
contributions are proportional to wages (up to the earnings cap), they are 
subject to a similar risk correction. For the measure we study here, where 
only future beneﬁ  t ﬂ  ows must be valued, the direction of the risk adjust-
ment eﬀect is unambiguous; Social Security obligations are worth less under 
market valuation. Once we consider adjusting both the assets (future taxes) 
and the liabilities of Social Security (including future accruals), the picture 
becomes signiﬁ  cantly more complicated, and preliminary results suggest 
that the market value of open group measures shows a larger deﬁ  cit than 
the actuarial value.
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